Recent years have seen an increase in democratic innovations [Smith 2009 ] aimed at increasing the participation of the public in policy-making. This observation, coupled with the increasing prevalence of internet-based communication, points to a very real possibility of implementing participatory democracies on a mass-scale in which every individual is invited to contribute their ideas and opinions [Salganik and Levy 2012] .
The Borda score of an idea x is defined as s(x) = i∈V (m − r i (x)), where r i (x) denotes the rank that participant i gives to idea x. That is, an idea receives m − 1 points if it was ranked first in a ranking, m − 2 if it was ranked second, and so on. Define the normalized Borda score of an idea x to be n(x) = s(x)/ x ∈C s(x ), so that the sum of all the Borda scores is 1. The Borda winner x * is any idea with the highest score, i.e. s(x * ) = max x s(x). Define an -Borda winner to be any idea x such that
. Define an -Borda ranking to be any ranking resulting from a normalized score vectorn such that for any idea x, |n(x) − n(x)| ≤ 2 /m. The Condorcet winner is defined as an idea x which beats all other ideas in a pairwise election. Define an -Condorcet winner to be an idea x which receives at least (1 − ) n 2 votes against at least (1 − )(m − 1) other candidates. These approximation definitions satisfy a simple interpretation: an winner or ranking of a social choice function is one that could have resulted from changing at most fraction of the true comparison values involving each idea.
Consider the following sampling algorithm (Algorithm 1). At each step, sample a participant uniformly at random and ask him to compare two ideas sampled uniformly at random. Increment a counter for the idea chosen by the participant and repeat N times. Now form an output ranking by ordering the ideas from those with the highest to lowest counter values, with ties broken arbitrarily. THEOREM 1.1. For any , δ ∈ (0, 1), Algorithm 1 with N = O( m 2 ln m δ ) returns an -Borda ranking with probability at least 1 − δ. Also, the top idea in the returned ranking is an -Borda winner with probability at least 1 − δ.
Though we will not detail it here, a more complex variant of Algorithm 1 is able to find an -Condorcet winner inÕ( comparisons correspond to a sequence of samples of Algorithm 1. We repeat this 100 times and calculate the average value of achieved at each point in time. Finally, we find the time at which equals 0.05 and 0.1 and plot this against the number of ideas in that topic.
The main observation to note is that the data series has a good linear fit, and that the constants are reasonable. Given a number of ideas, one can use the linear trend to calculate the total number of comparisons needed to achieve a desired approximation. Since the comparisons are randomly assigned, the expected number of comparisons per participant can be calculated by dividing the resulting number by n. For instance, when x = 100 and n = 1000, the linear trends indicate that (191 * 100 − 517)/1000 ≈ 18.6 comparisons per participant are needed to achieve = 0.05 and (84 * 100 − 228)/1000 ≈ 8.2 are needed for = 0.1. If one only needs to find winning ideas, one can do even better.
FURTHER INSIGHTS FROM THE FINNISH EXPERIMENT
Several other insights were found supporting the use of voting rules. We briefly mention them here.
Bias in rating. Users were asked to rate some ideas one to five stars. We found that the rating that a user gave to a prior idea greatly influenced the rating given to a subsequent idea. Following a one star rating, a one or five star rating happened 41% and 16% of the time respectively. However, following a five star rating, a one or five star rating happened 22% and 39% of the time respectively. Biases like this may be important factors in evaluating rating-based approaches [Balinski and Laraki 2007] .
Existence of Condorcet winners. Since a Condorcet winner beats all other proposals in a pairwise comparison, it is typically agreed that when one exists, it should be chosen as the winner. Surprisingly, out of the 41 topics in the Finnish experiment, the vast majority (38) of them had Condorcet winners. This gives several data points indicating that, in practice, one can often expect a Condorcet winner.
A potential benefit of partial rankings. In our experiment, we also asked participants to rank small groups of randomly chosen proposals and recorded the amount of time it took participants to complete the action. As shown in Figure 1b , it can be seen that the amount of the time per effective comparison elicited decreases in the range tested, potentially cutting total evaluation time by up to two-thirds.
To conclude, our algorithms and experiments show that social choice functions that were previously thought to place high cognitive burdens on participants can indeed be implemented at scale, a promising sign for the use of crowdsourcing in democratic policy-making.
